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Norms, Culture and Local Infrastructure: 
Evidence from a Decentralised Economy
* 
 
Culture as reflected in social and religious norms may be pivotal to social organization in a 
decentralised economy where local authorities are responsible for the provision of local 
public goods. We distinguish between individualist and collectivist cultures to argue that 
collectivist culture may promote rules to indulge in family, social and religious values at the 
cost of individual values promoting material objects and may thus result in inefficient choice 
of pubic goods. We use Indonesia as a case in point to classify communities strictly adhering 
to traditional adat laws and Islamic religion as promoting collectivist culture. Results using 
1997 and 2007 Indonesian Family Life Survey community-level panel data highlight that, 
even after controlling for other variables, traditional collectivist communities strongly adhering 
to adat and Islam tend to have significantly greater access to social (rather than physical) 
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Norms, Culture and Local Infrastructure: 




In recent years there has been a renewed interest to analyse whether the varied economic 
paths of different societies over time can be traced to differences in culture, customs, 
social norms and religion (e.g., see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006). The present 
paper builds on this literature to assess the role of culture, as reflected in religious and 
social norms, on the provision of local public infrastructure in a decentralised economy, 
which remains little understood.  
In an attempt to explain the apparent puzzle as to why do societies fail to adopt 
the institutional structure of more economically successful countries, Grief (1994), 
Platteau (2000), among others, have highlighted the role of culture, diverse social 
customs/beliefs/norms on economic development. Some social norms can provide an 
effective solution to the problem of social organisation while others can be harmful. For 
example, Grief (1994) highlights the merits of individualist (as opposed to collectivist) 
cultural beliefs for the formation of efficient agency relations in the context of medieval 
merchants. Putnam (1993) attributes the greater success of modern political institutions in 
northern Italy to the pre-existence of a strong civic culture. Bowles and Gintis (2004) 
argue how the ethnically linked parochial groups could achieve high levels of cooperation 
(i.e., inducing a collectivist culture) in informal contracts while engaging in exclusionary 
practices. Despite its importance, implications of culture- individualist or collectivist- for 
the provision of local public goods remain little understood. We argue that an 
understanding of culture is particularly relevant for the provision of local public goods 
and infrastructure especially in a decentralised economy where local governing bodies 
(rather than central government bureaucrats) have the authority to choose and provide 
these public goods.  
Decentralization is by and large a political decision of national leadership that 
involves devolution of political or fiscal powers to local governing bodies responsible for 
the provision of local public goods and services. Thus decentralisation has important 2 
 
 
economic consequences for local community development. Standard models of collective 
action argue that the provision of public goods depends on group size and group effort 
subject to free-riding on others’ efforts. Ethnic diversity may however impede collective 
action because of taste differences of different sections of the population (Alesina, Baqir 
and Easterly, 1999), unequal distribution of the benefits from public goods (Khwaja, 
2008) and/or inability to impose social sanctions in ethnically diverse communities (e.g., 
Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). Others have highlighted the importance of various political 
economy considerations, e.g., elite capture (Bardhan and Mukherjee, 2000) or legislator 
identity (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2002; Pande 2003; Besley et al. 2005) on the 
provision of local public goods in decentralised economies.  
We go beyond this literature to identify the possible role of culture on the choice 
of local public goods. In particular, following the influential work of cross-cultural 
psychologists (e.g., see Heine 2007), we distinguish between individualist and collectivist 
cultures. While individualist cultures emphasize rules promoting personal freedom and 
achievement at the expense of group goals, resulting in a strong sense of competition, 
collectivist cultures promote rules focusing on family and work group goals.  Group, 
family or rights for the common good (rather than the rights of individuals) is seen as 
most important in collectivist cultures, where rules promote order and stability of the 
society. Accordingly, collectivist culture may help reconcile conflicting preferences 
for/against a particular public good, even if it is inefficient (see further discussion below). 
Persistence of irrational/inefficient community behaviour is also highlighted in some 
recent works within Economics. In particular, Kranton (1996) argues that personal 
connections within an ethnic group may promote informal reciprocal exchange (as 
opposed to monetary market exchange) even if it is inefficient, especially in smaller 
societies; reciprocity however disappears as market develops. Bowles and Gintis (2004) 
goes further to show how ethnically linked parochial groups could achieve high levels of 
cooperation while engaging in exclusionary practices. Behavioural economists tend to 
(e.g., Easterlin (1995)) tend to argue that raising income for all may not necessarily 
increase happiness for all. For one thing, individual orientation of material objects/values 
(which generates more income) conflicts with collective-oriented values, such as family 3 
 
 
values, social and religious values. This conflict may create psychological tension, thus 
lowering personal well-being (Borroughs and Reindfleish, 2002). 
Indonesia is an important case in point which has a long tradition of political 
decentralisation although fiscal decentralisation (i.e., law 22/99) was introduced only in 
2001. This justifies our interest in local communities as decision making units (see 
further discussion of local government in section 2). The Dutch colonial rule recognized 
village governments as lawful entities and encouraged self-rule according to Adat laws. 
There are also longstanding efforts to shape lives in an Islamic way. All these efforts are 
further complicated by the nation’s attempt to impose modern state laws and decrees in 
the post-independent period with a view to remove local injustice and promote national 
integration. While adat laws were formally banned during Suharto’s regime, the formal 
ban did not result in the abandonment of these adat laws and the extensive 
decentralization process that followed the demise of Suharto in 1998 only reinstated them 
in 2001. Coexistence of Adat laws, Islamic Sharia laws and the positive laws of the 
modern state has thus defined Indonesia’s pluralistic identity. 
Literally ‘adat community’ translates to ‘autonomous’ groups of indigenous 
people who are able to manage their lives without knowing western laws and established 
their own regulations and social control. Adat laws are a set of local and traditional norms 
concerning marriage/divorce, birth, living arrangements of the elderly, inheritance and 
dispute resolution systems, land rights, gender role and decision making in the household 
as well as in the community, which lays the foundation for a collectivist culture. Adat 
livelihoods are often linked to land, water and natural resources, thus giving rise to a 
culture that is primarily rural in nature and where the ethic of mutual co-operation has 
been of paramount importance. There are also penalties for breaking the traditional laws 
which may range from advisory talk to imposing fine/penalty, being isolated or even 
moved out of the community.
1  
Indonesia has also a long Islamic tradition, which has been marked by a historical 
division between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ Islamic values/practices. One can distinguish 
‘Muslim modernists’, who seek to reform Indonesia, from the traditional ones. While the 
                                                 
1 The likelihood of fine/penalty or even being isolated in case of breaking a traditional law is about 44% in 
strongly adat (which is about double than that in others) communities  in our sample. 4 
 
 
traditional Islamic practices lean on Sharia laws and community integrity, Muslim 
modernists have close ties with the positive laws of the state, which is more 
individualistic in nature. Indonesians have also successfully harmonized the two legal 
traditions, namely adat and Islam.
2  
Set in this context, we assess the role of social and religious norms on 
choice/delivery of public infrastructural goods in a sample of 314 rural and urban 
communities in Indonesia. Our analysis is primarily based on Indonesian Family Life 
Survey (IFLS) community-level panel data-set for the period 1997-2007, which is an 
eventful time in the nation’s history.
3 This data allows us to classify communities into 
traditional and modern depending on their degree of adherence to adat laws and Islam. 
While communities strictly adhering to adat laws and Islamic religion are classified as 
traditional collectivist culture, others not doing so are labelled as individualist modern 
culture. Further support for this classification is obtained from the available information 
on the ethics of mutual co-operation in these communities (see discussion in section 2). 
This classification allows us to explore the role of culture, as reflected in social and 
religious norms, n differential choice of local infrastructure, if any.   
In an attempt to assess the role of culture, as reflected in social and religious 
norms, on choice/delivery of local infrastructure, we distinguish between social (health 
and education) and physical (utility, transport, communications) public infrastructural 
goods. While investment in social infrastructural goods like health and education may 
directly contribute to skills and productivity of community people, thus facilitating 
production/exchange within the community, investment in physical infrastructure like 
transport and communications may facilitate individualism promoting market exchange, 
trade with outside communities and therefore material achievements as measured in terms 
                                                 
2 It is envisaged that Adat and Islamic laws have existed side by side long before the intervention of the 
colonial powers in Indonesian legal affairs. The dialogue between the two sets of laws persists even in 
modern Indonesia which has been reflected in Indonesian laws on conditional repudiation, common 
property in marriage, obligatory bequest and also conflict resolution. 
3 In an attempt to promote national integration, Suharto’s New Order Period witnessed introduction of new 
policies and programmes including significant changes in property rights in land and other natural 
resources, which threatened the very basis of adat livelihoods. Onset of the economic crisis of the 1990s 
had cast a major blow to the infrastructural investment/ development in the country, which was followed by 





of income and growth; the latter may however threaten the very basis of a traditional 
collectivist culture as laid in adat laws and Islamic religion promoting family, social and 
religious values. Thus in an attempt to preserve their traditional identity, traditional (i.e., 
Islamic adat) communities may rationally choose to invest more in social (rather than 
physical) infrastructural goods. Thus choice of social infrastructure within a collectivist 
culture may encourage conformity within society and discourages individuals from 
standing out. The latter can be particularly facilitated by the perception of a common 
external threat during Suharto’s regime, giving rise to feelings of loyalty and norms of 
solidarity in an attempt to protect community identity/livelihood. In the absence of any 
prior evidence, we use the unique panel data at our access to test this central proposition.  
It is an important exercise as access to public infrastructure is understood to be 
central to economic growth. Neglect in the provision of public capital and infrastructure 
can adversely affect the productivity of private capital (e.g., see Reinikka and Svensson, 
2004). In contrast, good governments that invest in essential public goods and services 
realise high rates of return (e.g., see Easterly, 2001). Unlike most existing studies on 
Indonesia
4, we use community-level panel data-set to examine the role of social and 
religious norms on the provision of physical and social infrastructural goods in the 
sample communities. Since culture is inherited at birth, we rule out bias arising from 
simultaneity between choice of infrastructure and adherence to a particular type of 
culture, thus focusing on a causal relationship between the two, if any. Use of panel data 
allows us to minimise any estimation bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity in the 
data. 
Results highlight differential choice/delivery of infrastructural goods in traditional 
and modern communities. Ceteris paribus, there is evidence traditional communities 
strongly adhering to adat and Islam tend to have comparable/better access to social 
infrastructure (government schools and health facilities), but significantly lower access to 
some physical infrastructural goods like those linked to modern communications and 
                                                 
4 For example, Beard (2007) examines the effects of various household characteristics on household 
contribution to community development, while Bandeira and Levy (2007) focus on the role of democratic 
decision making on the provision of a number of public goods in Indonesia. Both these studies however use 
single cross-section IFLS data-set: Beard (2007) used third round of IFLS data while Banderia and Levy’s 
(2007) analysis is based on second round IFLS 1997. Olken (2007) in contrast use his own survey data to 
explore the political economy of public goods provision in Indonesia. 6 
 
 
transport. There is also confirmation that communities strictly adhering to adat and Islam 
tend to allocate significantly lower share of total development spending on local 
infrastructural goods. These results are robust to alternative specifications. 
The analysis is developed as follows. Section 2 describes the data and research 
setting while section 3 analyses the results. The final section concludes. 
 
2. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The analysis has been based on the community-level data obtained from Indonesian 
Family Life Survey (IFLS) data. In addition to LSMS type household level data, IFLS 
provides very detailed information on communities. In particular, each round of IFLS 
contains information on 314 rural and urban communities drawn from 13 provinces 
including Jakarta, Bali, Java (central, east and south), Sumatra (north, west and south), 
Lampung, Wntenara and south Kalimantan (for further details on the data see 
Frankenberg and Thomas, 2000; Strauss et al. 2009). Although IFLS has been conducted 
in 1993, 1997, 2000, 2007, only IFLS rounds 1997 and 2007 contain information on 
community’s adherence to adat laws and nature of governance; hence, our analysis makes 
use of 1997 and 2007 rounds of IFLS only.  
Local government in Indonesia consists of a headman assisted by an appointed 
village assembly (LMD) throughout the country. Development projects and assistance 
were managed by community resilience boards (LKMD) who allocated development 
grants (mainly from the central government) across households and projects. Law 22/99, 
enacted by January 2001 gave villages more autonomy in raising local revenues replacing 
central grants, thus paving the way for fiscal decenralisation. Elections for both the 
headman and the council now take place every five years and the headman is directly 
accountable to the council. Use of 1997 and 2007 IFLS data thus allow us to consider the 
years before and after the introduction of fiscal decentralisation.  
  We focus on a number of basic infrastructural goods that could directly impact on 
sustainable livelihoods and provide opportunities for all, especially for the poor. First, the 
list of physical infrastructural goods includes community’s access to cemented local 
roads PROAD (rather than national highways), motorized public transport PUBTRANS 
(public bus/boat), public telephone office PTO, post office PO. Since economic 7 
 
 
backwardness and poverty in the country have often been caused by remoteness and 
isolation, local roads and different modes of motorized transport are crucial for economic 
development and poverty alleviation. Similarly, communication goods like PO and PTO 
could reduce the disadvantages related to location and distance. Using principal 
components methods, we also generate a composite index PC_Comm of these four 
infrastructural goods. Further, we include access to two more essential infrastructural 
services, namely, banks and markets that could facilitate formal exchange, thus assisting 
the process of economic development. As such, inclusion of banks and markets would 
also allow us to test if the traditional communities have any aversion to formal modes of 
exchange (Kranton 1996). This allows us to include a second composite index PC_Exch. 
Finally, we compare the cases of these physical infrastructural goods with two important 
social infrastructural goods, namely, community’s access to government health and 
schooling facilities. 
Table 1 compares sample communities’ access to various local public 
infrastructural goods between 1997 and 2007. In general there has been a significant 
improvement in the access to pucca road and public telegraph office over this period 
while there has been marginal increase in the access to electricity and market; in contrast, 
there has been reduction in the access to piped water, public transport, post office and 
bank. We also consider the corresponding allocation of development spending on social 
and physical infrastructure in the sample communities, also available from IFLS. 
Evidently, share of development spending has declined over the decade and this decline 
has been accompanied by a significant increase in share of development spending on 
physical infrastructural goods. Having considered this general trend over the decade, we 
next explore whether/how traditional communities differ from modern communities with 
respect to the provision of (or spending on) these goods and services in our sample. 
  
2.1. Social and religious norms  
Our analysis classifies communities according to their adherence to (a) adat laws and (b) 
Islam. Depending on the degree of adherence to adat laws, IFLS data classifies a 
community into 4 categories: (i) traditional laws are almost never broken; (ii) sometimes 
traditional laws are broken; (iii) traditional laws are frequently broken and (iv) only a few 8 
 
 
people understand traditional laws.
5 We use this information to classify a community as 
‘adat’ community (a binary variable labelled ADAT1) if adat laws are almost never 
broken; the variable takes a value zero otherwise. Second, IFLS data also provides 
information on the main religion practised in a community; thus a community is 
classified to be an Islamic community (a second binary variable labelled ISLAM) if Islam 
is the main religion. It is also important for us to identify the ‘traditional Islamic 
communities’ from the rest. About 28% of all communities strongly adhere to adat while 
as high as 86% of these adat communities had Islam as the main religion. Accordingly, 
we classify Islamic adat communities as ‘traditional Islamic’ communities to distinguish 
them from others labelled as ‘modern Islamic’ communities. In the absence of any direct 
information in this respect, we create an interaction term ADAT1*ISLAM to account for 
Islamic Adat communities. Alternatively, we construct a composite index of ISLAM and 
ADAT using principal component method, which is labelled as PCNORM.  
Given the richness of the IFLS data, it is also possible to classify these 
communities according to their ethics of mutual co-operation, which we take to be a 
measure of collectivist culture. In particular, there is detailed community-level information 
on ethics of mutual cooperation as well as presence, if any, of mutual cooperation groups in these 
communities for various purposes including health, education, food security, security. As high as 
94% of strictly adat (which are also predominantly Islamic) communities tend to have mutual co-
operation groups; the proportion is about 70% for non-adat communities. The latter justifies, at 
least to some extent, our association of traditional adat communities to collectivist culture.  
Demographic dimensions of traditional adat communities in our sample are worth 
noting. Table 2 shows that these communities tend to be strongly ethnically linked and 
predominantly rural in nature; often these communities are inhabited by a single large 
ethnic population group while the average population size is significantly smaller than 
non-traditional communities. Also the proportion of university educated population tends 
to be much less though the difference is significant only at about 10% level. Role of 
education could be important in influencing culture, as education can reduce the role of 
inherited cultural aspects in the formation of priors (e.g., see Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales, 2004). Also, compared to non-traditional communities, traditional communities 
                                                 
5 This information is collected from the community leader or his/her assistants. 9 
 
 
have significantly lower access to selected physical infrastructural goods including public 
transport, post office, telegraph office, bank and market. These traditional communities 
are also more likely to be under-developed as measured by the proportion of communities 
receiving IDT funds.
6 In contrast, share of government schools is significantly higher in 
traditional communities while that of government health facilities is not statistically 
different between traditional and modern communities.  
There is also significant variation in average community characteristics across the 
provinces. Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the selected community 
characteristics across the sample provinces. In general, provinces with higher average 
population per community, higher proportion of university educated population and lower 
proportion of strongly adat communities tend to have better provision of all types of 
public infrastructural goods under consideration; these better off provinces also tend to 
have relatively lower proportion of under-developed communities. For example, the 
average community size is much bigger in Jakarta while influence of adat laws is rather 
negligible in the province; Jakarta is also the province with the lowest proportion of 




3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Provision of public infrastructure in a community highlights aspects of community 
organisation and preferences, which in turn depend on a number of community 
characteristics.  
 
3.1. Model specification 
Our objective in this section is to determine a community’s access to different public 
infrastructural goods in our sample. First of all, we distinguish between social and 
physical infrastructural goods. We consider two social infrastructural goods, namely, a 
                                                 
6 IDT or Inpres Deas Tertingadl was the primary antipoverty programme in the country and was targeted to 
the poorest communities. We use this information to classify sample communities as ‘underdeveloped’ if 
the community was selected for the implementation of IDT programmes; the rest of the communities are 
labelled ‘developed’. 10 
 
 
community’s access to government schools (Shgov_SCH), government health services 
(Shgov_HLTH); we also consider an index of communication infrastructural goods 
PC_Comm (involving PO, PTO, Proad and Pubtrans), an index of exchange 
infrastructural goods PC_Exch and a composite index of both communications and 
exchange infrastructural indexed by PC_GOOD1. We also have access to information on 
community level spending, which allows us to consider the corresponding allocation of 
total development spending; in particular, we consider a community’s share of 
development spending on social infrastructural goods (SHSOC) and also that on physical 
infrastructural goods (SHINFRA). Finally, we consider the share of total spending 
allocated to development (SHDEV) as an index of overall development of the 
community.  
In general, i-th community’s access to a given public good Yit in t-th year is 
determined as follows:  
                  1                       1                       
              
(1) 
where Y refers to the particular public good or share of public spending under 
consideration. While a community’s strong adherence to adat laws (Adat1) is used as an 
index of its social norms, its adherence to Islam (Islam) is the index for religious norms 
practised. We also include an interaction term between the two, i.e., Adat1*Islam to 
indicate if it is a traditional Islamic society. Alternatively, we also generate a composite 
socio-religious norm variable (PCNorm) using these two variables indicating 
community’s strong adherence to adat and Islamic norms, which modifies equation (1) as 
follows: 
 
                                                   (2) 
  
Note that i and    are the unobserved time-invariant community-level fixed-
effects (that does not change over time) in equations (1) and (2), controlling for 
community-level factors like government funding, external influences or administrator’s 
preferences, affecting the provision of the particular public infrastructure in question. We 
also include    and    respectively in (1) and (2), which are the unobserved year-specific 11 
 
 
fixed effects respectively in equations (1) and (2). Finally, uit and     are the idiosyncratic 
errors in (1) and (2), assumed to be distributed with zero mean and unit variance, which 
varies across community (i) and also over years (t). 
There could be an important time trend whereby more traditional communities 
may change to a non-traditional one over time. In order to capture the interaction effect of 
culture and time trend, we also estimate the following equation (3):   
                                                                 (3) 
Given our access to two-years (1997 & 2007) panel data, we use panel data fixed 
effects OLS (FE-OLS) regression models to estimate equations (1) and (2) for various 
components of public goods and/or public spending in our sample. Since there are only 
two years, these FE-OLS estimates are also identical to the corresponding first difference 
estimates. 
 
3.2. Other control variables 
Xit is the set of other control variables used to determine Yit. Following the literature on 
public goods provision, we include measures pertaining to (i) group size and its 
sustainability, (ii) characteristics of the community leader; and also (iii) community-
specific other demographic and locational factors.  
 
Group size and its sustainability 
We consider population size of the community as an index of group size involved in the 
collective action. We also include square of population to explore if there is any non-
linear effect in this respect. It is also important to consider the factors that could enhance 
the long-term sustainability of public action in a community. To this end, we include the 
proportion of community households with at least junior secondary schooling since a 
higher proportion of more educated (as opposed to illiterate) households could be better 
placed to lobby for the sustainability of group efforts geared towards essential community 
causes. We also include square of the share of community households with junior high 
school education to explore if there is any non-linear effect in this respect. In an 
alternative specification, we also include community’s mean monthly per capita 
household expenditure MPCE (both food and non-food items taken together) and also its 12 
 
 
square to test if the prosperity of the community too influences sustainability of collective 
action in our set-up. 
 
Characteristics of the community leader 
Since community government is the decision making unit in a decentralised set-up, 
characteristics of the community leader could be important in determining allocation of 
public spending or for that matter access to public goods. Community leaders are 
typically elected by popular votes and upon election they become members of the 
Indonesian Civil Service.  
IFLS data allows us to identify the characteristics of the community leader. Given 
that the gender of the leader is endogenous to the choice of programme (note that As high 
as 97% community leaders is male in our sample), our analysis focuses on other relevant 
characteristics of the leader. In particular, we consider education (i.e., if the leader has 
college education or more COLLEGE) and also the years in position of the community 
leader (if the tenure is 10 years or more).
7 While only about 28% leaders have college or 
higher education; about 38% of community leaders have been in tenure for 10 years or 
more. We shall examine the possible role of these characteristics on the allocation of 
public spending and also access to social and physical infrastructure in sample 
communities. 
 
Other community characteristics 
Existing literature suggests that ethnic heterogeneity of a community could play an 
important role in the community’s choice of public goods. 1997 and 2007 IFLS data 
provide the population information for three important ethnic groups in each community. 
We use this information to construct an index of ethnic heterogeneity using the formula 
1-pi
2 where pi is the population proportion of i-th ethnic group in the community, 
i=1,2,3. In addition, we include binary variables indicating whether a community is rural 
and also whether it has access to the sea since geographic location may also be important 
determinants of choice/access to public goods (e.g., see Barro 1999).  
  Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations of all the regression variables 
                                                 
7 We also considered age of the head, but did not include it as it is closely correlated to the tenure in office. 13 
 
 
used in our analysis.  
 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We estimate a community’s access to government schools, government health facilities, 
public communication goods as well as that to composite physical infrastructural goods. 
We also compare these estimates with the corresponding estimates for shares of 
development spending on social and physical infrastructural goods as well as share of 
total community spending on development. For each dependent variable of our choice, 
we start with the pooled ols estimates (see Table A1) and compare these with FE OLS 
estimates (Table 4). Appendix Table A2 shows the estimates derived from the 
conventional specification that excludes indices of social and religious norms. Estimates 
shown in Table 4 augments this baseline specification (Table A2) by three cultural 
variables, namely Adat1, Islam and Adat1*Islam. In particular, Columns 1-4 of Table 4 
shows the FE OLS estimates of various public goods, namely, share of government 
schools, government health facilities, access to composite communications as well as 
physical infrastructural goods. Further, columns (5)-(7) of Table 4 show the 
corresponding FE OLS estimates of three public spending shares, namely, share of 
development spending on social infrastructure, physical infrastructure and also share of 
development spending in total spending. Table 5 shows the corresponding estimates 
when we replace the culture variables Adat1, Islam and Adat1*Islam by the composite 
culture variable PCNORM obtained by using the principal component analysis. Again 
columns (1)-(4) of Table 5 shows estimates for various public goods while those in 
columns (5)-(7) show those for various public  spending accounts. Further, we consider 
separate estimates for public goods that promote formal exchange, namely, banks and 
market (see Appendix Table A3). Finally Appendix Table A4 shows the estimates of a 
community’s access to public goods and public spending including an additional 
argument, namely mpce (and also its square term to explore aspects of non-linearity, if 
any).  
Since culture is inherited at birth, we rule out estimation bias arising from reverse 
causality; nevertheless estimates could be biased because of unobserved heterogeneity. 14 
 
 
Since fixed effects estimates have the inherent property of minimising estimation bias 
arising from time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, we prefer these estimates to ols 
estimates; we include both community and year specific unobserved heterogeneity. 
Finally, all standard errors are clustered at the community level; otherwise our estimates 
would have been biased. Estimates are generally robust and do not change with the 
change of specifications. Our discussion in the rest of the paper is primarily couched in 
terms of the complete estimates shown in Tables 4 and 5.  
Our central hypothesis pertains to the role of cultural variables on a community’s 
access to various public goods (columns 1-4, Tables 4 and 5) and also its shares of public 
spending on relevant accounts (columns 5-7, Tables 4 and 5). There is confirmation from 
Table 4, ceteris paribus, a community’s strong adherence to Adat laws and Islamic 
religion (as reflected in the interaction term Adat1*Islam) tends to be associated with 
significantly lower access to composite communications goods, infrastructural goods as 
well as lower share of spending on infrastructure. In contrast, this interaction term is not 
statistically significant for the share of government schools and health facilities in our 
sample; more importantly, the coefficient of the interaction term turns out to be 
statistically significant and positive for share of spending on social infrastructure. These 
results are robust and hold when we replace Adat1, Islam and Adat1*Islam by the 
composite culture variable PCNORM as shown in Table 5, for example. In this case too, 
traditional communities, as measured by higher values of PCNORM, tend to have lower 
access to communication goods and also composite physical infrastructural goods; as 
before, share of spending on social goods is significantly higher while that on physical 
infrastructure is lower in more traditional communities. There is also evidence that 
traditional communities tend to have higher share of government schools. Estimates 
shown in Table A3 also indicate that Islamic communities tend to have significantly 
lower provision of exchange goods like banks and markets; the interaction term 
adat1*Islam is still negative, but not statistically significant. However the composite 
culture term PCNORM has a negative and statistically significant coefficient estimates. 
In other words, there is suggestion that these traditional communities may rely more on 
reciprocal exchange rather market-based exchange. 15 
 
 
 Table A4 shows the estimates of a further augmented model when in addition to 
the earlier explanatory variables we include community-level mean per capita household 
expenditure and also its square term. In general results pertaining to our central 
hypothesis remain unchanged, which in turn highlight the beneficial role of traditional 
culture on promoting investment in social rather than physical infrastructural goods.  
  Among other factors, there is some confirmation that the average education level 
of the community plays an important role though the effect appears to be non-linear and 
also depends on the nature of the public goods in question. In particular, the first order 
effect is negative for social infrastructural goods while it is positive for physical 
infrastructural goods or for that matter share of spending on the provision of physical 
infrastructural goods. There is also evidence that the square term is significant and is of 
opposite sign to the linear term. Ethnic heterogeneity is significant and negative for the 
share of government health facilities and composite infrastructural goods; but remains 
insignificant for access to government schools in the community.  
Regarding the effect of leader’s characteristics, it appears that leader’s 
characteristics are important only in the allocation of spending, but not so much in the 
community’s access to public goods. In particular, communities with more educated 
leaders and also those with greater tenure in the job tend to have higher share of   
spending being allocated to physical infrastructural goods.  
Geographic location of the community is also important. Thus, for example, rural 
communities tend to have lower share of development spending on physical 
infrastructural goods (shinfra) and also lower access to composite infrastructural goods 
(PCGood); similarly, a community with a border with the sea tends to have lower access 
to physical infrastructural goods.  
To summarise, these results highlight the contrasting role of traditional collectivist 
culture on access to social (as opposed to physical) infrastructural goods and support our 
central hypothesis: holding other factors unchanged, traditional Islamic adat communities 
in Indonesia tend to have significantly more access to social rather than communications 
infrastructure. We argue that investment in traditional social infrastructure directly 
benefits its people and community, rather than promoting interaction with the outside 
world, which may dilute their indigenous way of life. Other things remaining unchanged, 16 
 
 
this traditionalism tends to impede investment in innovation, transport and 




The present paper goes beyond the existing literature to argue that local culture, i.e., 
religious and social norms, could explain a part of the variation in the choice and 
provision of public goods and also allocation of public spending in local communities in 
a decentralised set up. In this respect we distinguish between individualist and collective 
culture arguing that collective culture may promote family, social and religious values at 
the cost of individual values and may result in inefficient choice of pubic goods that may 
impede development.  
Analysis using two rounds of Indonesian family life survey data and controlling 
for all possible covariates provide some support to our central hypothesis. There is 
evidence that traditional Islamic communities tend to have lower a provision of physical 
infrastructural goods like pucca road, motorized transport, post office, public telephone 
office, while preference is given to investment in social infrastructural goods like health 
and education facilities. While social infrastructural goods can contribute to exchange 
within/outside the community, investment in physical infrastructural goods could 
improve exchange outside the community and thereby innovation and growth of the 
region. A lower provision of physical infrastructural goods in traditional communities 
could thus highlight their attempt to preserve their indigenous way of life promoting 
collective culture. The latter however ignores the need for investment in physical 
infrastructure including roads, transport and communication, as poverty and 
backwardness is often a result of remoteness and isolation.  
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Table 1. Access to local infrastructure 
1997 2007 
Variable  Mean S.d. Mean  s.d. 
Public transport  0.7891  0.4086  0.75  0.4337 
Public telephone office  0.5112  0.5007  0.7532  0.4318 
Post  office  0.2684 0.4438 0.2468  0.4318 
Pucca  Road  0.8019 0.3992 0.9936  0.0799 
Piped  water  0.6102 0.4884 0.5224  0.5002 
Electricity  0.9681 0.1761 0.9936  0.0799 
Market  0.3994 0.4906 0.4519  0.4985 
Bank  0.4026 0.4912 0.1859  0.3896 
Share of govt schools  0.3644  0.1872  0.6851  0.2072 
Share of govt health facilities 0.461  0.0525  0.6167  0.1745 
Share of dev. Spending on social 
infrastructure  0.1162 0.1156 0.1319  0.1970 
Share of dev. Spending on physical 
infrastructure  0.0709 0.0849 0.5128  0.3647 
Share of total spending on 
development  0.5473 0.4077 0.4812  0.2913 
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Table 2. Inter-community heterogeneity, 1997-2007 
 
 Community  classification 
Variables Traditional  Non-
traditional  T-stat 
Access to bus 0.24 0.38 -4.211**
Access to any motorized 
public transport 0.72  0.82  -2.767** 
Access to market 0.32 0.46 -3.415**
Access to PTO 0.42 0.59 -3.399**
Access to PO 0.17 0.36 -4.820**
Access to bank 0.22 0.41 -4.478**
Access to pucca Road 0.66 0.82 -4.736**
Access to electricity 0.93 0.98 -2.496**
Access to piped water 0.46 0.65 -5.169**
Share of government schools 0.64 0.60 2.657*
Share of government health 
facilities 0.57  0.58  -1.285 
Rural 0.61 0.39 6.136**
District HQ or Provincial 
capital 0.18  0.21  -1.648* 
Under-developed UNDEV 0.18 0.14 1.780*
Strong adherence to adat 1 0.05 na
If Islam is the main religion 1 0.70 na
Largest population group 
>90% of total population 0.91  0.78  10.411** 
Proportion of households 
with junior high school edn 0.28  0.36  -7.273** 
Proportion of university 
educated households 0.08  0.26  -5.014** 
Population (number) 7040 11000 -5.357**
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Table 3. Inter-province variation in selected community characteristics 
  Community characteristics 
Mean (standard deviation) 





Islam is the main 
religion 
Under-developed 
Jakarta  30023.25 (14228.6)  0.19 (0.26)  0.03 (0.17)  0.31 (0.46)  0.11 (0.32) 
West Java  10056.3 (9693.6)  0.08 (0.12  0.20 (0.40)  0.98 (0.14)  0.14 (0.35) 
East Java  7424.09 (5740.1)  0.69 (0.88)  0.38 (0.49)  0.96 (0.21)  0.24 (0.43) 
Central Java  6513.25 (6275.7)  0.12 (0.32)  0.20 (0.40)   0.97 (0.17)  0.22 (0.42) 
North Sumatra  5562.9 (5639.8)  0.14 (0.49)  0.15 (0.36)  0.46 (0.50)  0.19 (0.40) 
South Sumatra  3869.6 (2499.6)  0.25 (1.10)  0.13 (0.34)  0.87 (0.34)  0.20 (0.40) 
West Sumatra  2453.4 (1099.2)  0.11 (0.15  0.29 (0.46)  0.93 (0.26)  0.21 (0.42) 
Bali  8624.3 (1599.6)  0.19 (0.22)  0.50 (0.51)  0 (0)  0.27 (0.45) 
Wntenara  8206.4 (4621.3)  0.05 (0.71)  0.50 (0.63)  0.87 (0.33)  0.63 (0.49) 
Ykarta  13411.00 (10081.7)  0.19 (0.25)  0.26 (0.44)  1.00 (0.00)  0.16 (0.37) 
Lampung  5016.09 (2771.4)  0.03 (0.03)  0.45 (0.51)  0.81 (0.39)  0.27 (0.45) 
Sulawesi  4897.0 (5218.15)   0.08 (0.13)  0.63 (0.49)  0.63 (0.49)  0.31 (0.47) 
South 
Kalimantan 
3850 (4040.6)  0.08 (0.12)  0.46 (0.51)  0.85 (0.37)  0.15 (0.37) 
Note: Number in each indicates the proportion of total sample communities (except for population total). 
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Table 4. FE OLS estimates of public goods and public spending  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES shgov_sch  shgov_hlth  PCcomm  pcgood1  Shsoc  shinfra  shdev 
Population  -1.08e-05 2.23e-06 2.27e-05 5.11e-05 -3.03e-05 1.44e-05 -3.93e-05 
  (8.79e-06) (7.64e-06) (4.77e-05) (5.53e-05) (2.71e-05) (2.76e-05) (2.94e-05) 
Sq(population)  5.48e-11  0  -2.22e-10 -6.57e-10 5.13e-10 -2.66e-10 6.23e-10 
  (1.15e-10) (1.03e-10) (5.67e-10) (6.70e-10) (3.18e-10) (3.49e-10) (3.90e-10) 
Share of hh edn>JHS 
(pjhs) 
-0.922*** -1.092***  1.828*  0.860  -0.522*  1.942***  2.419*** 
  (0.239) (0.195) (0.963) (0.882) (0.294) (0.516) (0.638) 
Sq(pjhs) 0.590***  0.633***  -2.041***  -1.812***  0.543**  -1.209***  -0.904* 
  (0.190) (0.152) (0.778) (0.674) (0.235) (0.438) (0.522) 
Ethnic  heterogeneity 0.0532 -0.105*  -0.599**  -0.567**  0.0730 -0.0403 -0.106 
  (0.112) (0.0606) (0.245)  (0.257) (0.0945) (0.184)  (0.207) 
Head  edn>=SHS  0.0335 -0.00205 -0.0198  0.0271  -0.0499  0.197*** -0.165 
  (0.0436)  (0.0312) (0.174)  (0.178)  (0.108) (0.0726) (0.111) 
Tenure>=10  0.0208 -0.0247 0.0336 -0.0249 -0.0718  0.161** -0.129 
  (0.0333) (0.0241)  (0.128)  (0.124)  (0.0537) (0.0708) (0.0968) 
Rural  -0.0595  -0.0365 0.560***  -0.377** -0.0569 -0.169**  0.199 
  (0.0709)  (0.0455) (0.193)  (0.147) (0.0449)  (0.0818) (0.145) 
Sea  -0.0124  -0.00869 -0.194** -0.169** Dropped Dropped  -0.0466*** 
  (0.0179) (0.0200) (0.0862) (0.0805)      (0.0134) 
Adat1 0.0367  0.0386  0.587***  0.439**  0.0879  -0.326***  -0.159 
  (0.0565)  (0.0670) (0.223)  (0.208) (0.0580)  (0.0798) (0.183) 
Islam  0.154*** 0.0295  -0.333**  -0.515*** 0.0714 -0.263*** 0.0712 
  (0.0385) (0.0313)  (0.149)  (0.170)  (0.0620) (0.0942) (0.0997) 
Adat1*Islam -0.0429  -0.0277  -0.583**  -0.517**  0.187***  -0.491***  0.365* 
  (0.0653)  (0.0727) (0.275)  (0.262) (0.0612) (0.110)  (0.211) 
Constant 0.582***  0.780***  -0.250  0.206  0.452***  -0.523**  0.103 
  (0.105)  (0.0938)  (0.477) (0.540) (0.160) (0.244) (0.303) 28 
 
 
Community  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  419 416 422 422 269 271 411 
R-squared  0.808 0.704 0.315 0.266 0.258 0.694 0.233 
Number  of  commid  305 302 306 306 219 220 305 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.FE OLS estimates of public goods and public spending in terms of composite culture measure 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Sh_gov_sch  Sh_gov_hlth  PC_comm  Pcgood  Shsoc  shinfra  Shdev 
Population  -9.71e-06  2.34e-06 1.57e-05 4.19e-05 -2.84e-05  -9.58e-07  -3.55e-05 
  (9.40e-06)  (7.59e-06) (5.08e-05) (6.01e-05) (2.58e-05) (3.00e-05) (2.99e-05) 
Square  of  Popn.  2.89e-11 1.22e-11  -1.54e-10 -5.41e-10 5.16e-10* -1.10e-10  5.73e-10 
  (1.23e-10)  (1.04e-10) (5.97e-10) (7.09e-10) (3.06e-10) (3.69e-10) (3.97e-10) 
Share of hhs>=JHS(pjhs) -1.046***  -1.133***  2.166**  1.454 -0.421  1.902***  2.167*** 
  (0.247)  (0.190) (0.971) (0.915) (0.303) (0.560) (0.610) 
Square of pjhs  0.667***  0.659***  -2.245***  -2.177***  0.492**  -1.202**  -0.720 
  (0.187)  (0.148) (0.753) (0.680) (0.244) (0.483) (0.508) 
Ethnic  heterogeneity  0.0459 -0.104* -0.518** -0.470*  0.0841  -0.0643  -0.164 
  (0.121)  (0.0605) (0.260)  (0.282) (0.0929) (0.188)  (0.223) 
Leaders edn. >=shs  0.0574  0.00822  -0.0180  -0.0188  -0.0490  0.187**  -0.156 
  (0.0452)  (0.0317) (0.185)  (0.173)  (0.108) (0.0772) (0.110) 
Leader’s  tenure>=10  yrs  0.0329  -0.0203 0.0153 -0.0679 -0.0788  0.166** -0.103 
  (0.0338)  (0.0249)  (0.134)  (0.130)  (0.0559) (0.0758) (0.0961) 
Rural   -0.0774  -0.0409  0.554***  -0.393**  -0.101*  -0.0426  0.192 
  (0.0696)  (0.0450) (0.200)  (0.162) (0.0564) (0.123)  (0.146) 
Sea   -0.0165  -0.00985  -0.181**  -0.148*  Dropped  dropped  -0.0542*** 
  (0.0180)  (0.0191) (0.0827) (0.0756)      (0.0149) 
Pcnorm 0.0380***  0.00142  -0.133**  -0.146**  0.0347  -0.0890**  -0.0173 
  (0.0145)  (0.0127) (0.0614) (0.0657) (0.0221) (0.0396) (0.0399) 
Constant 0.723***  0.811***  -0.566  -0.308  0.454***  -0.598**  0.244 
  (0.104)  (0.0818)  (0.471) (0.561) (0.162) (0.249) (0.283) 
Community  FE  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  419  416 422 422 269 271 411 
R-squared  0.793  0.701 0.278 0.194 0.231 0.644 0.192 
Number  of  commid 305  302 306 306 219 220 305 




Table A1. Pooled OLS estimates of social and composite physical infrastructural goods 
 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
VARIABLES shgov_sch  shgov_hlth  PCcomm  Pcgood1  shsoc  shinfra  Shdev 
Population -4.84e-06*  1.98e-06  6.66e-05***  8.81e-05***  -1.22e-06  -5.45e-06  7.79e-06 
 (2.68e-06)  (1.56e-06)  (1.03e-05)  (1.09e-05)  (2.75e-06)  (3.83e-06)  (5.51e-06) 
Square of Popn.  2.90e-11  -7.53e-12  -8.28e-10*** -1.02e-09***  6.74e-11  1.87e-11  -9.09e-11 
 (4.57e-11)  (3.04e-11)  (1.81e-10)  (1.88e-10)  (4.66e-11)  (7.42e-11)  (9.61e-11) 
Share of hhs>=JHS  -0.594***  -0.451***  3.153***  2.888***  0.0371  0.0133  0.747** 
  (0.155)  (0.0902)  (0.720)  (0.698)  (0.163) (0.266) (0.346) 
Square of pjhs  0.471***  0.405***  -2.117***  -2.119***  -0.0322  0.112  -0.485 
  (0.155)  (0.0983)  (0.632)  (0.643)  (0.182) (0.303) (0.338) 
Ethnic heterogeneity  0.0355  -0.0241  -0.0925  -0.136  0.00598  -0.0372  -0.247*** 
 (0.0318)  (0.0162)  (0.165)  (0.164)  (0.0232)  (0.0398)  (0.0662) 
Leaders edn. >=shs  -0.00950  0.0134  0.254**  0.128  0.00333  0.0376  -0.0388 
 (0.0245)  (0.0118)  (0.120)  (0.118)  (0.0249)  (0.0267)  (0.0534) 
Leader’s tenure>=10 
yrs 
-0.0378* -0.0157*  0.142  0.208**  0.0152  0.00754  -0.0528 
 (0.0199)  (0.00909)  (0.101)  (0.102)  (0.0201)  (0.0227)  (0.0441) 
Rural   0.00137  -0.0216  -0.309**  -0.348**  0.0531*  -0.0464  0.0255 
 (0.0273)  (0.0139)  (0.134)  (0.134)  (0.0275)  (0.0317)  (0.0580) 
Sea   -0.0228**  -0.000105  -0.0790  -0.102**  0.00519  0.00547  -0.0242 
 (0.00969)  (0.00401)  (0.0526)  (0.0461) (0.0140)  (0.0159)  (0.0194) 
adat1   0.0825*  0.0411  0.0253  0.131  0.0485  -0.120  -0.187* 
 (0.0427)  (0.0374)  (0.195)  (0.180)  (0.0442)  (0.0725)  (0.0995) 
Islam   0.0289  0.0338*  -0.0852  -0.156  0.0375  -0.00129  0.0129 
 (0.0266)  (0.0176)  (0.117)  (0.132)  (0.0257)  (0.0436)  (0.0632) 
Adat1*Islam -0.0773  -0.0479  -0.196  -0.326*  -0.0524  0.134*  0.248** 
 (0.0480)  (0.0373)  (0.215)  (0.195)  (0.0495)  (0.0749)  (0.107) 
Constant 0.554***  0.534***  -1.428***  -0.902*  0.0591  0.128  0.660*** 31 
 
 
 (0.0927)  (0.0507)  (0.456)  (0.480)  (0.0673)  (0.0972)  (0.158) 
Districts  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  419  416  422  422  269 271 411 
R-squared  0.556  0.583  0.591  0.556  0.162 0.511 0.179 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2. FE OLS Estimates of public goods without cultural variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES shgov_sch  shgov_hlth  PCcomm  pcgood1  shsoc  shinfra  Shdev 
Population  -1.08e-05 2.29e-06 1.94e-05 4.60e-05 -3.13e-05 6.50e-06 -3.56e-05 
  (9.01e-06) (7.49e-06) (4.95e-05) (5.86e-05) (2.61e-05) (2.96e-05) (3.02e-05) 
Square  of  Popn.  4.03e-11  1.28e-11  -1.94e-10 -5.85e-10 5.61e-10* -2.28e-10  5.74e-10 
  (1.20e-10) (1.03e-10) (5.79e-10) (6.84e-10) (3.10e-10) (3.46e-10) (3.99e-10) 
Share of hhs>=JHS  -1.038*** -1.133***  2.105**  1.388 -0.419  1.895***  2.167*** 
  (0.249) (0.188) (0.966) (0.917) (0.315) (0.552) (0.614) 
Square of pjhs  0.633***  0.657***  -2.101***  -2.017***  0.480*  -1.172**  -0.703 
  (0.190) (0.144) (0.771) (0.711) (0.251) (0.462) (0.504) 
Ethnic  heterogeneity 0.0172 -0.105* -0.410* -0.350  0.0862 -0.0694 -0.151 
  (0.113) (0.0606) (0.244)  (0.252) (0.0968) (0.186)  (0.221) 
Leaders edn. >=shs  0.0493  0.00798  0.0118  0.0142  -0.0335  0.148  -0.153 
  (0.0457)  (0.0316) (0.175)  (0.165)  (0.109) (0.0928) (0.109) 
Leader’s  tenure>=10  yrs  0.0405 -0.0201 -0.0106 -0.0965 -0.0607  0.120  -0.105 
  (0.0341) (0.0252)  (0.134)  (0.133)  (0.0575) (0.0799) (0.0955) 
Rural  -0.0269 -0.0390 0.377**  0.198  -0.0562 -0.158*  0.169 
  (0.0650)  (0.0412) (0.175)  (0.135) (0.0388)  (0.0836) (0.137) 
Sea  -0.0182 -0.00991  -0.175** -0.142* dropped dropped  -0.0520*** 
  (0.0184) (0.0189) (0.0819) (0.0765)      (0.0135) 
Constant 0.725***  0.811***  -0.566  -0.308  0.436**  -0.551**  0.245 
  (0.101)  (0.0814)  (0.467) (0.557) (0.170) (0.259) (0.285) 
Community  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  419 416 422 422 269 271 411 
R-squared  0.783 0.701 0.240 0.147 0.200 0.601 0.191 
Number  of  commid  305 302 306 306 219 220 305 





Table A3. Estimates of market exchange goods 
 
  (1) OLS  (2) FE  (3) FE  (4) FE  (5) FE 
VARIABLES  pcexch1 pcexch1 pcexch1 pcexch1 pcexch1 
       
vpop  8.59e-05***  8.09e-05 8.65e-05 7.74e-05 9.04e-05 
  (1.31e-05) (5.72e-05) (5.38e-05) (5.80e-05) (5.56e-05) 
sqpop  -9.65e-10***  -1.07e-09 -1.18e-09* -1.03e-09 -1.23e-09* 
  (2.33e-10) (6.92e-10) (6.82e-10) (7.10e-10) (7.10e-10) 
pjhs  1.946**  0.364 -0.336 0.421 -0.442 
  (0.763) (1.060) (1.012) (1.060) (1.022) 
sqpjhs  -1.708**  -1.444* -1.113 -1.581* -1.031 
  (0.712) (0.841) (0.775) (0.825) (0.794) 
ethhety  -0.154 -0.261 -0.453 -0.363 -0.460 
  (0.168) (0.347) (0.341) (0.367) (0.355) 
headshs  -0.0362  0.0427 0.111 0.0145 0.115 
  (0.132) (0.174) (0.199) (0.172) (0.196) 
tenure10  0.266** -0.135 -0.0469 -0.110 -0.0596 
  (0.110) (0.140) (0.136) (0.139) (0.139) 
rural  -0.301*  -0.0261  0.0991 0.141 0.0996 
  (0.158) (0.112) (0.147) (0.138) (0.140) 
sea  -0.128***  -0.0676 -0.0979 -0.0730 -0.0960 
  (0.0487)  (0.109) (0.105) (0.105) (0.106) 
adat1  0.274  0.103  0.149 
  (0.231)  (0.321)  (0.329) 
islam  -0.227   -0.614***  -0.613*** 
  (0.153)  (0.189)  (0.190) 
adat1_islam  -0.415*   -0.258  -0.302 
  (0.249)  (0.352)  (0.356) 
pcnorm1      -0.125*   34 
 
 
      (0.0737)   
mpce       -2.37e-08 
       (4.32e-08) 
sqmpce       0 
       ( 0 )  
Constant  -0.0717  -0.164 0.466 -0.164 0.464 
  (0.474) (0.601) (0.564) (0.600) (0.572) 
       
Observations  422 422 422 422 422 
R-squared  0.365 0.143 0.243 0.167 0.246 
Number  of  commid    306 306 306 306 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4. FE OLS estimates of public goods and public spending with control for mpce 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
VARIABLES shgov_sch  shgov_hlth  pcinfra1  pcgood1  shsoc  shinfra  shdev 
           
vpop -1.12e-05  -1.72e-06  2.01e-05  5.15e-05 -3.51e-05  1.46e-06  -4.05e-05 
  (9.09e-06) (8.08e-06) (4.99e-05) (5.88e-05)  (2.97e-05) (2.91e-05) (3.02e-05) 
sqpop  6.36e-11  8.04e-11  -1.64e-10  -6.41e-10  6.13e-10 6.30e-11 6.51e-10 
  (1.14e-10) (1.15e-10) (6.02e-10) (7.18e-10)  (4.42e-10) (5.05e-10) (3.96e-10) 
pjhs -0.910***  -1.012***  1.892*  0.840  -0.316  1.692***  2.443*** 
  (0.247) (0.198) (0.962) (0.875) (0.270)  (0.499)  (0.646) 
sqpjhs 0.577***  0.562***  -2.113***  -1.819***  0.374*  -0.927**  -0.934* 
  (0.196) (0.156) (0.793) (0.685) (0.223)  (0.444)  (0.516) 
mpce  6.62e-10 1.47e-08** 6.63e-09  -1.22e-08 2.64e-08* -4.58e-08** 1.73e-09 
  (1.01e-08) (7.44e-09) (3.43e-08) (3.74e-08)  (1.48e-08) (1.94e-08) (2.97e-08) 
ethhety 0.0479  -0.112*  -0.624**  -0.599**  0.0388  -0.00192  -0.122 
  (0.114) (0.0600) (0.257)  (0.267) (0.0933)  (0.161)  (0.207) 
headshs  0.0314 -0.0101 -0.0336 0.0164 -0.0638  0.198*** -0.171 
 (0.0428)  (0.0303)  (0.176)  (0.174)  (0.107)  (0.0731)  (0.107) 
tenure10  0.0213 -0.0164 0.0378 -0.0307 -0.0512 0.110**  -0.127 
  (0.0332)  (0.0229) (0.133)  (0.128) (0.0640) (0.0520) (0.0960) 
rural -0.0560  -0.0286  0.578***  0.395***  -0.0618  -0.117  0.208 
  (0.0701)  (0.0465) (0.198)  (0.143) (0.0395) (0.0918)  (0.139) 
sea -0.0124  -0.00995  -0.194**  -0.168**  Dropped  Dropped  -0.0463*** 
  (0.0179) (0.0198) (0.0871) (0.0825)      (0.0143) 
adat1  0.0377  0.0153 0.588**  0.476** 0.0109  -0.169*  -0.158 
  (0.0611)  (0.0612) (0.232)  (0.223) (0.0615) (0.0899)  (0.190) 
islam 0.153***  0.0228  -0.344**  -0.525***  0.0589  -0.255***  0.0651 
  (0.0386)  (0.0331) (0.151)  (0.171) (0.0514) (0.0763) (0.0986) 
adat1_islam -0.0438  -0.00477  -0.583**  -0.552**  0.106*  -0.367***  0.365* 
  (0.0690)  (0.0683) (0.278)  (0.268) (0.0610)  (0.120)  (0.221) 
Constant 0.584***  0.797***  -0.230  0.224  0.451***  -0.441**  0.115 36 
 
 
  (0.105)  (0.0969)  (0.484)  (0.552)  (0.166) (0.218) (0.308) 
Community  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
District  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  419 416 422 422 269  271  411 
R-squared  0.808 0.716 0.317 0.271 0.310  0.763  0.235 
Number  of  commid  305 302 306 306 219  220  305 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 